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I. INTRODUCTION
Current economic conventional wisdom indicates that the economy of the United States
prior to the Civil War was unstable and fraught with recessions. The collapse of the Second Bank
of the United States by Andrew Jackson’s hand left the United States without a central bank or
lender of last resort, and many state banks produced their own banknotes for currency exchange.
These different currencies made it difficult to unite interest rates across state lines, inhibiting
interstate commerce, and banking panics in the antebellum period often led to declines in lending
and investment that drove recessions.1 The National Bureau of Economic Research,2 the premier
authority on business cycle dating, identifies five recessions in the two decades prior to the Civil
War.
By comparison, the period from 1984 to 2007, more commonly referred to as the Great
Moderation, was unusually stable and productive. With the exception of two brief downturns in
1991 and 2001, the period was characterized by low economic volatility and rather constant
growth.3 Many explanations have been provided for this heretofore-unknown economic
condition, including enhanced monetary policy, improved investment management, and
technological breakthroughs. Without a comparable period of economic stability available, and
in the light of the recent recession, though, it is difficult to determine fully the cause of this Great
Moderation.
While these two periods may appear to be radically different in their economic climate, a
closer examination of the data reveals both periods were very economically stable and

1

Arthur J. Rolnick, Bruce D. Smith, and Warren E. Weber, “The Suffolk Bank and the Panic of
1837: How a Private Bank Acted as a Lender-of-Last-Resort,” Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis Research Department Working Paper 592, 1998, p. 4.
2
Henceforth, NBER.
3
James H. Stock and Mark W. Watson.,“Has the Business Cycle Changed and Why?” NBER
Macroeconomics Annual, Vol. 17 (2002), p. 160.
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productive in the United States. Joseph Davis’ industrial production series for the United States
from 17904 indicates that the period from 1841 to 1856 was marked by low volatility and high
growth relative to the rest of the antebellum and even the postbellum periods. Furthermore, these
periods both featured improvements in investment management and technological breakthroughs
– information technology and telegraphs, railroads, and canals, respectively – that accelerated
industrial production.
This paper examines the economic climate of the period of 1841 to 1856, which I term
the “first” Great Moderation. Using Davis’ industrial production index, I use basic economic
calculations to measure growth and volatility in the antebellum and postbellum period. I compare
these results to measures taken from an index of the New York Stock Exchange to better identify
declines in volatility. I will then compare these numbers to sectoral indexes to evaluate whether
this stability was the result of economy-wide or individual shifts, as well as to railroad
development to measure how it may have precipitated industrial growth.
My analysis indicates that volatility in industrial production and stock markets declined
significantly during the first Great Moderation. These results are important due to the economic
condition of the time. For example, the lack of a central financial authority during this period,
termed the “free banking period”, creates doubts about the impact of monetary policy on widescale economic volatility. These results also indicate factors that may more reliably contribute to
great moderations.

4

Joseph Davis, “An Annual Index of US Industrial Production, 1790-1915,” The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, Vol. 119, No. 4 (Nov. 2004), pp. 1177-1215.
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW
A. CAUSES OF GREAT MODERATIONS
The “second” Great Moderation was a period of significantly low economic volatility
from1984-2002. During that time, the standard deviation of GDP growth was only 59% of that
from 1960 to 1983.5 To better understand the economic climate of the first Great Moderation, I
will start by examining the possible causes of periods of low volatility. I can identify three
primary explanations (excluding luck) for the low volatility of the period.
The most popular of these explanations is the use of monetary policy. Beginning in the
early 1980s under Paul Volcker, the Federal Reserve shifted from a monetary policy aimed at
economic growth to one targeting the inflation rate. Boivin and Giannoni, using counterfactual
analysis of models comparing monetary policy and private-sector parameters before and after
1979, determine that monetary policy after 1979 is more effective at addressing economic
shocks. Furthermore, output volatility decreased between pre- and post-1980 samples, but only
for models with post-1979 monetary policy, indicating that while monetary policy did not
entirely contribute to the decline in output volatility of the Great Moderation, it did have a
significant impact.6
Second, improvements in inventory management and investment led to reduced
investment volatility. McConnell and Perez-Quiros emphasize the effect of improved inventory
management techniques in reducing investment volatility. Analyzing inventory-to-sales ratios for
durable and nondurable product industries, they find that these ratios have been declining rather
constantly since 1983. This shift coincides with a decrease in the amount of time in advance

5

James H. Stock and Mark W. Watson.,“Has the Business Cycle Changed and Why?” NBER
Macroeconomics Annual, Vol. 17 (2002), p. 164.
6
Jean Boivin and Marc P. Giannoni, “Has Monetary Policy Become More Effective?” The Review of Economics
and Statistics, Vol. 88 No. 3 (August 2006), p. 458
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producers order their materials, which allows the producers to save money on inventory
management. This decrease in cost would be reflected in a decrease in investment volatility, as
shorter lead times and cheaper inventory management would make production cheaper and more
predictable. While this decrease in inventory-to-sales ratios does not occur for nondurable goods,
McConnell and Perez-Quiros indicate that a decline in durables volatility during that period
would be “sufficient to account for the break in the volatility of aggregate output.”7
Blanchard and Simon, breaking down GDP into its component parts and measuring the
volatility of each from 1952 to 2000, indicates a large decrease in the volatility of investment,
especially inventory investment. Comparing inventory investment growth to the growth in
output, they find that beginning in around 1984, inventory investment is negatively correlated
with output growth.8 This supports McConnell and Perez-Quiros’ conclusion that output
increased due to a shift from procyclical to countercyclical inventory investment, as this decrease
in inventory investment correlation coincides with the decrease in output volatility.
Finally, technological advances such as the Internet revolution may have decreased
market volatility. Pastor and Versonesi, examining market beta, volatility, value, and
productivity found similarities between a predicted model and the NASDAQ, NYSE, and private
sector during the tech bubble of the 1990s. In both cases, stock price was lower for 6-8 years
after the initial technological breakthrough, before peaking sharply. In the case of the tech
bubble, market volatility was lower in the mid-1990s, before peaking sharply in the late 1990s
and early 2000s, when the bubble burst. This is consistent with the model’s prediction of a sharp

7

McConnell, Margaret, and Gabriel Perez-Quiros (2000). "Output Fluctuations in the United States: What Has
Changed since the Early 1980s?" American Economic Review, 90, pp. 17-18, 23
8
Olivier Blanchard and John Simon, “The Long and Large Decline in U.S. Output Volatility,” Vol. 2001 No. 1
(2001), pp. 157, 161
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increase in systemic risk.9 While this indicates that technological revolutions lead to market
instability prior to widespread adoption, they also appear to contribute to declines in volatility
during the years following a breakthrough.

B. ANTEBELLUM ECONOMY
Measurements for the antebellum economy are sparse, due to the scarcity of data for the
period. Nonetheless, there have been several attempts at producing an effective series to measure
antebellum economic movements. However, many of these involve interpolation of scant data
signs, producing highly erratic series. Calomiris and Hanes point to two notable examples –
series by Robert Gallman and by Thomas Berry – which suffered from a lack of accuracy prior
to the Civil War and attempted to fill in these gaps via assumption. Calomiris and Hanes
themselves construct a series for antebellum output, but also hesitate to label their results more
than the beginning of such an endeavor.10
Nonetheless, many studies have examined the economic conditions of the antebellum
period. Calomiris and Hanes themselves find evidence that volatility was potentially higher in
the antebellum period than the postbellum. However, they reason that aggregate volatility should
appear in the data as volatility in each individual series, and these variations occur only in some
of their products.11
Goldin and Margo test the impact of deflation on unemployment during the 1839
downturn by comparing real wage trends to a factor for persistence of shocks. They determined
that price shocks had less of an impact in the heavily-agricultural Midwest than in productive
9

Ľuboš Pástor and Pietro Veronesi. “Technological Revolutions and Stock Prices.” NBER Working Paper 11876.
2005. pp. 36-37
10
Calomiris, Charles W. and Christopher Hanes. “Consistent Output Series for the Antebellum and Postbellum
Periods: Issues and Preliminary Results.” The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 54 No. 2 (June 1994), pp. 410
11
Ibid., p. 416.
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hubs like the Northeast, indicating that deflation produced unemployment in “industry and urban
areas.” The comparative constancy of real wages in agriculture suggests that it was likely less
volatile as a whole than manufacturing, at least around 1839. Goldin and Margo also find that the
antebellum period was marked by volatile real wages and periods of significant deflation,
especially around recessive periods.12
Rostow, by contrast, argues that the 1840s and 1850s represent a period of rapid growth
in the United States. Christening this period the American “take-off period”, Rostow emphasizes
the rapid development of railroad technology and industrial production, and their subsequent
diffusion into the Midwest, as a catalyst for sustained growth.13 Similarly, David, while skeptical
of a “take-off” in the two decades prior to the Civil War, indicates that growth in the United
States around 1840 was not significantly lower than in prior decades. For example, despite the
downturn of the late 1830s, real GDP per capita increased approximately 19% to 22% from 1830
to 1840.14 This indicates that the United States was economically stronger in 1840 and
subsequent years than the effects of the Crisis of 1837 would initially suggest.

C. RECESSION CHRONOLOGIES
Despite these impressions, the most commonly accepted business cycle chronology, the
NBER chronology of US business cycle expansions and contractions, reports fifteen separate
periods of recession from 1796 to the beginning of the Civil War, including seven between 1830
and 1860. This reflects the primary findings of two NBER studies that laid the groundwork for

12

Claudia Goldin and Robert A. Margo. “Wages, Prices, and Labor Markets Before the Civil War.” NBER Working
Paper No. 3198, 1989. p. 19.
13
W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto. 3rd Edition. Cambridge, United
Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. 1990. p. 38
14
Paul A. David. “The Growth of Real Product in the United States Before 1840: New Evidence, Controlled
Conjectures.” The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 27 No. 2 (Jun. 1967), p. 184.
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early business cycle dating, Thorp’s Business Annals and Burns and Mitchell’s Measuring
Business Cycles. These two studies argue that antebellum business cycles were erratic due to a
series of financial panics in the 1830s, 1840s, and 1850s which, when coupled with the lack of a
central banking structure after the collapse of the Second Bank of the United States, led to
prolonged periods of deflation and recession.15 These panics, and the perilous economic
conditions that produced them, would seem to inhibit long-run economic stability.
However, recent reevaluations of these studies show data errors that overstate the impact
of downturns. Thorp’s data is based on qualitative reports of the time, rather than quantitative
data, which “tended to portray business conditions as ‘still weak’ following a downturn” and
fails to always correctly differentiate between an absolute recession and a relative decline in
growth.16 Burns and Mitchell, meanwhile, use a combination of Thorp’s Annals and historic
indexes to measure out turning points. However, Romer indicates that their dating for the years
between 1884 and 1927 used detrended data that places peaks earlier and troughs later when
determining recessions when compared to post-1945 NBER dating methods.17 Watson also
demonstrates that these variations between business cycle measurements disappear when cyclical
data is limited to nominal prices for commodities, crude materials, and financial instruments.18
This would indicate that an index based solely on quantitative measures of key economic
indicators would better reflect absolute peaks and troughs in economic growth.
By comparison, Davis uses his index of industrial production, based on quantitative
measures of key economic indicators, to construct an alternate business cycle chronology for
15

Willard Long Thorp. Business Annals. NBER General Series, No. 8. New York: NBER, 1926; Arthur F. Burns
and Wesley C. Mitchell. Measuring Business Cycles. New York: NBER, 1946.
16
Joseph Davis. “An Improved Annual Chronology of U.S. Business Cycles,” Journal of Economic History, Vol. 66
(2006), pp. 103–121.
17
Christina D. Romer. “Remeasuring Business Cycles.” The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 54 No. 3 (Sep.
1994), pp. 576-582
18
Mark W. Watson. “Business-Cycle Durations and Postwar Stabilization of the U.S. Economy.” American
Economic Review Vol. 84 No. 1 (1994), pp. 38-39
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1790-1915, which is reproduced in table 2. This new chronology indicates that the NBER
chronology, especially prior to the Civil War, overstates the duration and number of recessions.
These results are consistent with Romer’s and Watson’s cycles for after 1884. In addition, the
Davis chronology supports Romer’s conclusion that antebellum business cycles were no more
volatile than those after the Civil War.19 This indicates that the Davis index, upon which the
chronology is based, is a more accurate depiction of economic activity for the 19th century.
One consideration is that Davis’ index largely reflects industrial production for a time
period with a largely-agricultural economy. As Davis emphasizes, though, industrial production
is reliant upon non-industrial inputs, which represent a cross-section of a nation’s economy.20
Since Davis’ data is largely taken from measurements at major trade hubs and trade journals,
there is some production, especially in agriculture, that may go unmeasured, but we would argue
that the impact of these goods would be small as a result. Since such a large percentage of trade
goods in that time went through only a few cities, especially in the developing West, and these
centers were also transportation hubs, any goods that aren’t measured in our index likely were
not destined for industrial production, but rather local or individual consumption. Without going
far, these goods would as a result have only a minor impact on the market, we argue these
unmeasured goods constitute an insignificant portion of the market, and thus do not undermine
the validity of Davis’ index.

19

Romer. “Remeasuring Business Cycles.” p. 602
Joseph Davis. “An Annual Index of US Industrial Production, 1790-1915.” The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, Vol. 119, No. 4 (Nov. 2004), pp. 1180

20
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III. DATA ANALYSIS
A. INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
For the data, we began by calculating annual growth rate for each year. Using this data,
we proceeded to calculate annual volatility by taking the standard deviation of the growth rate of
each year and the two preceding for each year with such available data. It is worth noting that
this data does leave our volatility measurements susceptible to sudden economic shifts from
previous years, but we argue that, since a year’s economic climate is necessarily the product of
these shifts, it is reasonable to expect that an economy may be measurably volatile as a result of
previous shocks. Three-year samples ensure that variations from previous years are measurable
without diluting their significance. To obtain a rough estimate of growth and volatility in each of
our three measurement periods – prior to 1840, 1841-1856, and after 1866 – we also calculated
the average and standard deviation of the growth rates for these three periods.
Table 1 shows the results of these calculations. During the first Great Moderation,
industrial production as represented by the Davis index grew at approximately 60 percent faster
than during the rest of the antebellum or during the postbellum. These results are confirmed by
Figure 1, which shows growth rates in the Davis Index from 1790 to the present. Not only are
growth rates consistently positive during the first Great Moderation, comparing that period to the
second Great Moderation shows that economic growth during the former period was also
generally greater. Likewise, the standard deviation and coefficient of variation (the ratio of the
standard deviation and average of growth) of IP growth were respectively at least 20 and 50
percent lower during the first Great Moderation. These results are confirmed as well by Figure 2,
which shows the growth-to-volatility ratio (the inverse of the coefficient of variation) peaked
during the first Great Moderation, even exceeding the levels of stability reached during the

9

second Great Moderation. These results indicate that not only was growth greater during the first
Great Moderation, it was also much more stable, even when compared to modern business
cycles.
To better measure differences in growth between the three periods, we performed t-tests
comparing growth rates for 1841-1856 with pre-1840 and post-1866. These tests showed that
average growth was greater for the first Great Moderation than the rest of the antebellum or the
postbellum at a 5% significance level.

B. MONTHLY STOCK DATA
I can corroborate these findings that the first Great Moderation was very productive and
stable in stock returns of the period. I use Goetzmann, Ibbotson, and Peng’s monthly stock index
from 1815-1926 to measure stock returns and volatility for the first Great Moderation in the
same manner as with the Davis IP index. Goetzmann, Ibbotson, and Peng’s index uses methods
akin to that of the CRSP index for stock prices after 1926 to ensure the data for both periods is
comparable, and assembles data for all stocks with publicly posted prices. Thus, this index is an
ideal source for our measurements of variation in stock prices before, during, and after the first
Great Moderation.21
Table 1 shows that the average (arithmetic) stock returns averaged .3 percent per month
during the Great Moderation. As with the Davis IP index, stock returns for the first Great
Moderation were at least fifty percent greater than prior years or during the postbellum. In
addition, the standard deviation and coefficient of variation of those returns were lower for the
first Great Moderation than other periods, again by at least half. This indicates that the stable,
high growth indicated by the Davis index were not just the result of isolated variations, but rather
21
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a market-wide increase in productivity and decrease in volatility. Figure 3 further demonstrates
this result – fluctuations in price appear to be generally more positive and less volatile than in
other periods measured.

C. SECTORAL PRODUCTION AND ECONOMIC INDICATORS
I next constructed IP indices for durable and nondurable goods from the Davis IP dataset.
The durable goods sector includes chemical fuels, machinery, and metals. The non-durable
goods sector consists of food, textiles, and leather products. I then calculated growth rates and
coefficients of variation for durable and nondurable goods in the same way as for the industrial
production index.
The summary statistics are reported in Table 5. For nondurable goods production, annual
growth rate averaged approximately 6.9 percent during the First Great Moderation and the
remainder of the antebellum period. During the postbellum period, the growth rate of nondurable
production dropped to 4.9 percent per annum. Economic growth in nondurable production was
less volatile during the First Great Moderation. The standard deviation of the growth rate of
nondurable production averaged 6.7 percent during the First Great Moderation compared to 9.8
percent during the rest of the antebellum period. The standard deviation of nondurable goods
production averaged only 5 percent during the postbellum period. The coefficient of variation is
lower during the First Great Moderation (.971) compared to 1.417 for the non-First Great
Moderation period and 1.02 for the period after the Civil War.
Durable goods production, meanwhile, was both significantly higher and more stable
during the first Great Moderation. Durable goods production grew at an annual rate of 9.5
percent during the first Great Moderation, compared to 5.5 percent for the remainder of the
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antebellum period and 5.7 percent for the postbellum period. The standard deviation of growth
for the first Great Moderation was significantly lower, 6.8 percent, than for the rest of the
antebellum period, 10.7 percent, as well as for the postbellum period (10.9 percent). The
coefficient of variation was .72 during the First Great Moderation compared to 1.92 for the rest
of the antebellum period and 1.901 during the post-bellum period. The simple summary statistics
suggest that durable goods production played an important role in promoting stability and growth
during the first Great Moderation.
While the coefficients of variation for both durable and nondurable production were
lower for the First Great Moderation than for the surrounding periods, the secular declines in
these coefficients are not perfectly aligned. The coefficient of variation for nondurable goods
reached their lowest level in the mid-1840s, while the coefficients of variation for durable goods
production reached their lowest value several years later. This suggests that the correlation
between the two sectors significantly declined during the First Great Moderation. To test this
hypothesis, I regressed the growth rate of durable goods production growth on the growth rate of
nondurable goods production, a First Great Moderation dummy, and the interaction between the
growth rate of nondurable goods production and the Great Moderation dummy. The regression
results are presented in Table 6.
The regression results suggest that there is an 80 percent correlation between the growth
rate in durable and nondurable goods production over the entire sample period that is statistically
significant at the one percent level. The First Great Moderation dummy is also statistically
significant at the one percent level. The indicator variable suggests that the growth rate of
durable goods production was six and a half percent higher during the First Great Moderation.
The interaction variable between the growth rate of nondurable goods production and the First
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Great Moderation dummy is negative and statistically significant at the one percent level. The
coefficient on the interaction variable suggests that the correlation between the growth rate in
durable goods production and nondurable goods production fell from 80 percent to about 23
percent during the First Great Moderation. This suggests that there was a structural change in the
relationship between the durable and nondurable goods sectors during the First Great
Moderation, which would explain why growth rates in nondurable goods were unchanged
through the antebellum. These results in turn indicate that increases in the production of durable
goods played a major role in the overall economic growth of the period.
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III. UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST GREAT MODERATION
A. COTTON AND AGRICULTURAL MARKETS
Stability in agricultural markets, especially cotton, played a major role in reducing
volatility during the First Great Moderation. More than half of the country’s economic output
was in the form of agricultural products and textiles,22 which represented approximately onethird of antebellum GNP.23 This was especially true in the south where the production of cotton
constituted a large percentage of overall economic activity. Textiles represent more than 20
percent of the Davis IP index in the antebellum period.24
As shown in Table 4, cotton prices grew faster during the first Great Moderation and with
more stability than during prior years or the years following the Civil War. Prices during the first
Great Moderation grew approximately three times as fast as in prior years, although those rates
represent fractions of a percent; furthermore, the coefficient of variation of price changes for the
first Great Moderation are only one-third those of the rest of the antebellum and the postbellum.
The similarity of the coefficients of variation for these two periods in particular indicates that
cotton markets during the first Great Moderation were uniquely stable compared to in other
periods, which would significantly contribute to the stability of the economy as a whole.
Temin argues that supply shocks such as weather played an important role in determining
cotton supply. For the period of 1820-1859, Temin constructs regressions for American cotton
supply to identify the factors that influenced that production – specifically, the impact of the
prior year’s price on production via different land apportionments. He finds that the only factor

22

Joseph Davis. “An Annual Index of US Industrial Production, 1790-1915.” The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, Vol. 119, No. 4 (Nov. 2004), pp. 1177-1215.
23
Joseph Davis, Christopher Hanes, and Paul W. Rhode. “Harvests and Business Cycles in NineteenthCentury America.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 124 no. 4 (2009), pp. 16751727.
24
Davis, “US Industrial Production”, p. 1188
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that directly influenced quantity was time, which serves most obviously as a proxy for
population growth. Domestic prices for cotton had an insignificant effect on what farmers would
produce in future years; nor does Temin find any evidence that farmers willingly held stock back
to account for unusually good harvests. 25 Furthermore, when Temin’s supply regression is
factored into his equation for British prices, the time variables in those two equations nearly
cancel each other out, indicating that time-related factors in supply and demand such as
population growth had a relatively small impact on prices. Thus, the only factors that appear to
independently influence cotton prices are general price levels and random factors affecting
supply, the most prominent of which are weather-related harvest fluctuations. This indicates that
long-term weather events, such as droughts, would have a corresponding long-term effect on
prices.
To evaluate these weather effects, I obtained Palmer drought severity index (PDSI) for
the southeastern United States to measure variations in weather effects for the region over time.
(See Figure 4.) These index values reveal that, through the first Great Moderation, the
southeastern United States experienced a period of almost constant, albeit mild to moderate,
drought. This came at a time when cotton consumption exploded both domestically and
internationally. During the first Great Moderation, United States produced 80% of the world’s
cotton; not only would such a collapse in production directly affect domestic prices, these two
factors contributed to more inelastic export demand, which would explain higher prices in
droughts like those of the first Great Moderation both internationally and domestically.26 The
25

Peter Temin. “The Causes of Cotton-Price Fluctuations in the 1830s.” The Review of Economics and Statistics,
Vol. 49 No. 4 (Nov. 1967), pp. 467-8.
26
See also Douglas A. Irwin. “The Optimal Tax on Antebellum U.S. Cotton Exports.” Journal of International
Economics, Vol. 60 (2003). p. 276. Irwin estimates the elasticity of export demand at only -1.7 – still inelastic, but
not tremendously so. Nonetheless, due to the sheer size of the United States’ share of the world cotton supply, one
would expect any significant weather event such as the droughts of the first Great Moderation to significantly affect
prices both internationally and domestically.
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persistence of these droughts during the first Great Moderation, in turn, would reduce price
volatility
Taken together, these two factors seem to explain much of the price stability during the
first Great Moderation. As shown in Table 1, cotton price volatility during the first Great
Moderation was lower than for the preceding or succeeding periods as measured by the standard
deviation in price changes. The coefficient of variation for cotton prices was approximately twothirds lower than the pre-First Great Moderation period or the postbellum period (1866-1913).
This can probably be attributed to increasing demand for cotton in Britain and stable weather
patterns. Low price elasticity in Britain would keep price shifts steady, reducing price volatility
and diminishing the impact of other shocks. In addition, good weather through the first Great
Moderation prevented price spikes such as those in the 1830s that increased market volatility.
These factors kept agricultural production, representing a significant portion of the Davis index,
stable between 1841 and 1856.

B. TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION
The first Great Moderation was characterized by the widespread adoption and use of
several important technologies: railroads, canals, and the telegraph. While steam railroads were
introduced to the United States with the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad in 1828, it took
approximately two decades of innovation and capital investment to have a significant impact on
the antebellum economy. Prior to the 1840s, canals served as the primary means of transportation
for shipping commodities, especially from the West. The creation of the Erie Canal in 1817
posed the first serious challenge to previous transportation systems such as turnpikes, and
allowed greater access to western hubs from New York and New England. Freight rates over the
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Erie Canal quickly decreased to an average of 1.68 cents per ton-mile for eastbound freight and
3.35 cents for westbound.27 By comparison, freight rates for railroads in the mid-1830s were
often 7-10 cents per ton-mile.28 Rail mileage accelerated through the 1830s and 1840s, reaching
3,328 miles in 1840 and 8,879 by 1850. Railroad mileage by 1850 had also outpaced canals in 25
states, including major production hubs like New York and Massachusetts, and in many states
where this was not the case (such as Pennsylvania), canal mileage had not increased in the
previous decade.29
Furthermore, comparing ton-mile rates for railroads and canals in 1853 and travel times
for railroads and canals in 1852 reveals that rails could transport the goods in one-third to onehalf of the time of canals, at 2-3 times the price, with that gap narrowing even further by 1860.
As a result, rails began to replace many water routes in the 1840s and 1850s (with the notable
exception of the Erie Canal, which maintained steady trade through the first Great Moderation).
Both experienced an increase in tonnage in the West, but for water routes this was largely the
result of massive Western migration, which increased demand across the board.30 This process
accelerated with the construction of almost 22,000 miles of track built in the 1850s. By the eve
of the Civil War, railroads had replaced canals as the predominant means of transportation.
Railroads had a major impact on agricultural productivity in the 1850s. Fishlow examines
agricultural yields for Western counties with and without water access in 1849 and 1859
(presumably before and after the arrival of railroads). He found that counties with water access in
1849 produced almost half of the total wheat and two-fifths of the total corn for the region with
only one-third of the total land. By 1859, the gaps were narrowed to two-fifths and 37 percent,
27

George R. Taylor. The Transportation Revolution 1815-1860. New York: Rinehart & Company. 1951, p. 137.
Albert Fishlow. American Railroads and the Transformation of the Ante-bellum Economy. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press. 1965. pp. 323-324.
29
Taylor, Transportation Revolution. p. 79.
30
Ibid, pp. 135, 137, 139, 165.
28
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respectively. Removing some cities with relatively close access to water magnifies these
differences.31 While this does not prove that railroads increased agricultural yields, it does
suggest that access to market is positively correlated with the amount of produce farmers had an
incentive to create. Atack and Margo determined that even under the most conservative
estimates, railroads were responsible for at least 25 percent of acreage improvements in the
1850s, and this impact was likely closer to 68 percent. The increased production was the result of
both greater transportation of yields to market and improvements made by farmers in
anticipation of these yields.32
Many scholars have debated the affect of railroads on antebellum industrialization.
Atack, Haines, and Margo examine the impact rail access had on the development of factories in
the 1850s. Factories, defined as manufacturers with sixteen or more employees, are used as a
proxy for industrial production because firms of that size represented a shift away from the
artisan shops that were widely used at the beginning of the century. More employees meant
manufacturers could utilize a division of labor, a key component of industrial mass production.
Their examination of major Eastern cities finds that rail access made it 19 percent more likely
that a random firm would be a factory.33 While one may argue that this doesn’t necessarily imply
causality (that is, the railroad may have been built to serve the factory, rather than vice-versa),
there are two problems with that argument. First, Atack, Haines, and Margo reproduce these
results with two other tests, indicating that there is some link between the initial railroad and
subsequent factory development.34 Second, factories are by definition only useful in conjunction
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with effective transportation. Railroads, being both cheaper and faster than canals, could quickly
transport the additional production of a factory with division of labor at a better per-ton-mile rate
in the 1850s, especially compared to canals in the 1830s and 1840s. This indicates that the rise of
the railroad was a precondition for factory development, and that division of labor would not be
adopted without a railroad already available. Thus, railroads served to catalyze industrialization
in the 1850s.
However, there is disagreement among scholars of the period as to what degree railroads
impacted industrial growth during the first Great Moderation, especially during the 1840s.
Rostow points to the 1840s and 1850s as the likely “take-off point” in the United States. In his
view, this take-off was the result of two simultaneous trends: railroad and industrial growth in
the East in the 1840s, and the western expansion of these technologies in the 1850s.35 Davis
points out the proximity of Rostow’s take-off point to a spike in industrial production starting
around 1840. He de-emphasizes that peak’s proximity by comparing it to another, smaller spike
in production in the 1830s, arguing that “industrial production advanced at a more rapid pace
following the Civil War.”36 However, as established by my earlier analysis, this argument only
holds if you take 1800-1860 as the same period. The twin supply shocks of industrialization and
rail development, reflected by the twin peaks in production in the 1830s and 1840s, are more
comparable to the postbellum period than the decades following the American Revolution. The
first Great Moderation – which neatly overlaps Davis’ second peak – had a greater average
growth rate than the postbellum period; furthermore, the growth rates achieved at the peak of the
first Great Moderation are higher than at any other time before World War I, including the
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industrialization of the 1830s, further lending credence to the idea that more factors than just
increased industrial production were at work in shaping the Great Moderation.
Fishlow disputes the notion that railroads had a hand in increased industrialization in
New England in the 1840s, and provides several alternate explanations for strong industrial
growth in the 1840s, such as low cotton prices leading to textile expansion and increased demand
for materials and fuel for railroads.37 As previously noted, stable and low cotton prices did
contribute somewhat to the stability of the greater economy during the first Great Moderation.
However, in the Davis IP index and the economy of the time, these other sectors represent
comparably far smaller segments of overall production than cotton, and thus had a far smaller
impact on aggregate industrial growth during the first Great Moderation.38 Individual shifts in a
sector could be equally construed as larger supply shocks, such as railroads, or the impact of a
specific trade policy or pricing system for a set of years. Since total industrial production is less
susceptible to individual sectoral shifts, it stands to reason that it features less of the noise that
may disguise market-wide supply shocks such as railroads. Furthermore, these individual sector
shifts cannot account for the low volatility of the period. The difficulty is in identifying to what
degree railroads played a part in the high growth and low volatility of the 1840s, when they were
in development. Fishlow’s analysis of railroad’s impact on industrial production aside, it is clear
from the data that there was at least some portion of the 1840s where railroad proliferation was
low enough to not account for the low volatility and high growth of the first Great Moderation.
Pastor and Veronesi find that there is approximately an 8-year period between the first
decline in volatility of a new technology’s stock and when the stock “bubble” bursts. For
railroads, their data shows a steep decline in stock price volatility for railroads in 1847 and a

37
38

Fishlow. American Railroads, pp. 240-261.
Davis, “US Industrial Production”, pp. 1186-1188

20

subsequent steep increase in volatility in 1856, roughly consistent with their estimations. The
increase in volatility is met with a similarly sharp increase in volatility in non-railroad stocks,
indicating that market permeation of railroad technology had reached the point where
fluctuations in railroad stock returns had a measurable impact on the market as a whole.39 The
bubble burst in 1857 roughly coincides with my estimated end date for the first Great
Moderation, further suggesting a decrease in the volatility of railroad stocks had some hand in
the latter part of the Great Moderation. However, prior to 1847, there is little evidence that
railroads had been adopted enough to have a measurable impact on volatility and growth.
One possible explanation for this discrepancy can be found in the aforementioned canals,
which were still growing through the 1830s and in some states through the 1840s. The use of
canals as a mechanism for shipment of industrial inputs would help account for the period of
time before railroads became economically viable. However, while the 1830s, when canals
became the primary means of long-distance freight transport, had growth comparable to that of
the first Great Moderation, volatility was also much higher for the years preceding the crises of
1837 and 1839, indicating that canals only had a marginal impact on economic fluctuations. One
possible reason for this is that canals could only reach producers with water access, and this
limited its benefit to many Midwestern farmers. Fishlow demonstrates that agricultural
production in areas with water (and, presumably, canal access) was disproportionately higher
than for areas without.40 This meant that, while farms with canal access would grow faster, these
benefits were limited to only about one-third of counties, which limited their economic impact.
Thus, while they did have an impact on growth in the 1840s, canals alone cannot explain to a
sufficient degree the high growth and low volatility present in the first Great Moderation.
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Another new technology that contributed to economic development in the antebellum
was the telegraph. The westward expansion of the period created new demand for eastern
products. Prior to the telegraph, it often took a long time to order goods. Telegraphs provided a
solution to this problem, and combined with the transportation innovations of the 1840s and
1850s, facilitated economic activities in the western territories. This in turn spurred rapid
expansion of telegraph lines and increased competition, which catalyzed the stabilizing effects of
the railroads and canals.41 As each technology benefited from its use with the other, and demand
pushed expansion westward, businesses were better able to reach consumers, increasing stability
and growth.

C. FINANCIAL INTEGRATION
Bodenhorn examines monthly interest rates for antebellum cities to measure financial
market integration during the Free Banking Period (1837-1862). During the 1830s, interest rates
were highly variable and volatile. However, beginning in the early 1840s, regional interest rates
in the United States began to converge. The convergence occurred despite the fact that President
Jackson vetoed the bill to renew the Charter of the Second Bank of the United States, the closest
antebellum equivalent to a central bank. Bodenhorn argues that banks in this period were
increasingly efficient at mitigating regional variations in interest rates and minimizing interest
rate volatility. Comparing New York City and Charleston, Bodenhorn demonstrates that interest
rate differentials for the two cities hovered around zero from 1844-1857, punctuated by minor
brief episodes of variation. Despite the geographic distance, interest rates in Charleston strongly
resembled those in New York City during the first Great Moderation; it wasn’t until the panic of
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1857 that interest rates in the two cities diverged for an extended period of time, though even in
that crisis rates still remained generally consistent compared to crises prior to the first Great
Moderation.42
These results are also seen in further examination of differences for all cities in
Bodenhorn’s sample. For each month, I calculated the average interest rate, the standard
deviation, and the coefficient of variation rates in each city. Table 4 shows that interest rates
began to converge in the 1840s. Interest rate volatility is relatively constant until the onset of the
recession and the financial panic in 1857. The coefficient of variation is also low for the period
1843-1857. Although the empirical analysis is somewhat limited because of missing data for
some cities, the results suggest that interest rate variability in individual states were very low
during the first Great Moderation, which would contribute to greater economic stability.
I have two possible explanations for interest rate convergence in the first Great
Moderation. Bodenhorn notes that northeastern banks, which were chartered only in their
particular states and thus could not spread their practices directly, began forming correspondent
partnerships with banks in other states to facilitate interstate operations.43 The 1830s saw the
spread of many of these networks from New England into the Midwest and South. The interstate
arrangements allowed banks to purchase bills of exchange from each other, exchanging their
paper for currency with which one bank could adjust its reserves. This allowed banks to increase
their loan supply and target interest rates as well as the ability to better adjust their portfolio to an
unexpected shock to loan demand. Furthermore, improvements in transportation and
communication technology meant that banks could more easily transfer money to markets with
42
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the largest demand for capital. Prior to 1840, transportation costs were high enough that banks
often could not rely on other lenders to handle sudden increases in the demand for capital.
Instead, banks would respond by increasing interest rates that would reduce investment. With the
rise of canals and then railroads, banks could better target their reserves to reduce interest rate
fluctuations. Bodenhorn emphasizes that transportation was still comparatively expensive, but I
would contend that its existence helped promote growth by allowing banks to loan additional
funds, with the knowledge that it could acquire emergency funds from another bank quickly. The
rise of telegraphs, which were frequently constructed with railroads during the 1840s and 1850s,
provided banks with quicker access to funds, further reducing interest rate fluctuations between
different regions in the United States.44
Financial market integration probably played an important role in the high growth rates
and low macroeconomic volatility of the first Great Moderation. Capital could more easily flow
to its greatest source of need. In addition, low interest rate volatility reduced the uncertainty of
future investment and raised consumer confidence. Lance Davis, for example, finds that the low
variation in short-term interest rates in the two decades prior to the Civil War promoted
economic growth in New England textile mills.45 These results are consistent with what we
would expect to occur in all industrial sectors of the economy, indicating that low interest rates
catalyzed such development.

D. WESTERN EXPANSION
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Western migration accelerated through the antebellum period, spurred on by the prospect
of inexpensive land for agriculture.46 One prominent theory, first posed by Turner, held that
western expansion served as a “safety valve” for the unemployed in the East, who could
transition into western agriculture.47 Many scholars have identified several flaws with Turner’s
theory, such as the prohibitive cost of moving west for some workers.48 Nonetheless, Turner’s
theory does indicate that western expansion during the first Great Moderation may have
produced steady growth in industrial production.
Ferrie examines the conditions and outcomes of migrants to the West to determine the
validity of Turner’s safety-valve hypothesis. Using data on a sample of men in the 1850 census
and collecting data on their backgrounds, decision on whether or not to travel west, and
outcomes, Ferrie constructs a model for the probability of western migration and change in real
wealth. His regression shows that moving to the frontier translated into a 45 percent gain in real
wealth during the 1850s, indicating that it was advantageous for at least some migrants to head
west – indeed, the regression indicates that expected wealth gains had a statistically significant
impact on the probability of moving west. Ferrie’s regressions also indicate that those most
likely to migrate were laborers in cities with population greater than 10,000, also consistent with
Turner’s theory.49 Margo, building on a hypothesis first posited by Coelho and Shepherd,
indicates that real wages for common labor and artisans were respectively 11 percent and 24
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percent higher in the Midwest than in the Northeast in the 1850s, an increase from 10 percent
and 21 percent in the 1840s.50
Since many workers went west to find employment in agriculture, some of this economic
growth was the result of increased production (and, presumably, demand for workers) from
railroad expansion, at least for the period of Ferrie’s study. The large railroad expansion of the
1850s may also have fueled individual gains, at least in agricultural sectors, as increased
production in farms would increase the marginal product of labor and thus make more money
without indicating greater economic growth. However, this does not take into account potential
gains from population growth in the Midwest resulting from railroads. Vandenbroucke found
that removing growth in transportation costs for households led to noticeably lower growth in
land improvement and population, particularly in the antebellum period.51 Not only does this
indicate the importance of railroads in western migration, it indicates that land improvement
without that migration would have been significantly blunted.
Western migration also decreased national economic volatility through the development
of a national labor market. Margo argues that the antebellum period was a period of significant
real wage convergence. In the 1830s, Midwestern real wages for common labor were 30.5
percent higher than the East, but as previously mentioned this ratio fell to just over ten percent
during the first Great Moderation.52 Vandenbroucke demonstrates that western/eastern real wage
ratios, which had widely varied prior to the early-to-mid 1840s, declined and remained relatively
stable for the remainder of the antebellum and postbellum periods. This decline suggests that real
wages across the United States were converging, forming the beginnings of a “national labor
50
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market,” with stable real wages across the country. Vandenbroucke emphasizes that the
convergence in eastern and western wages converge during the first Great Moderation was also
accompanied by lower volatility in the labor market after 1843.53 The convergence of wages
contributed to macroeconomic stability by integrating labor markets and making them more
efficient. Overall, real wage convergence appears to have been an important determinant of
reduced economic volatility during the first Great Moderation.

E. WAGES AND PRICES
This conclusion appears at first glance inconsistent with perceived volatility in wage and
wholesale price data during the first Great Moderation. However, I argue that, in addition to
wage convergence, greater market mobility and variation contributed to wage-price flexibility,
which reduced the duration of real wage shocks.
Table 1 shows the average, standard deviation, and coefficient of variation of growth rate
for wages and wholesale prices. For wages, I found that coefficients of variation for the first
Great Moderation were lower than the rest of the antebellum and the postbellum respectively.
Growth rates for wages were also higher during the first Great Moderation than for the
postbellum, though not significantly. I found similar results for wholesale prices – coefficients of
variation and growth rates were respectively lower and higher for the first Great Moderation than
for the antebellum or postbellum, though again not to a statistically significant degree.
However, the fifteen-year rolling averages tell a different story. Coefficients of variation
for both wages and prices prior to the Civil War were more erratic and generally higher than the
postbellum years. For example, while fifteen-year standard deviations of wage growth rates
decreased steadily through the first Great Moderation, wage fluctuations contributed to unstable
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variations. One explanation for this difference is that the duration of major increases in
coefficients of variation are small, especially when considering the large test period. This means
that the impact of these spikes were relatively small, especially during the first Great
Moderation. These fluctuations in wholesale prices and wages pose a second question, however:
why was industrial production so strong at the same time prices were so unpredictable?
Goldin and Margo argue that wage-price flexibility during the antebellum period
stabilized industrial production against wage and price fluctuations. With land expansion in the
west and greater access to that land via transportation technology, the theory holds, laborers in
the east who found themselves out of work could shift to agricultural production in the west with
minimal effort, thus minimizing the impact of shocks. In addition, Goldin and Margo find that
prices and nominal wages were more flexible in response to price fluctuations. This flexibility
occurred despite demonstrably greater price and nominal wage fluctuations during that period.54
During the first Great Moderation, no central bank existed to offset price flows due to
bimetallism and crop yields. This, coupled with monetary fluctuations such as the California
Gold Rush of 1849-1850, meant that price shocks were more severe and thus banking panics
would be more common. However, because consumers and producers were more likely to
respond to price changes, in the long run lower nominal wages would lead to increased
production to offset the fluctuations. Therefore, the theory holds, greater employment and wage
flexibility during the first Great Moderation minimized the effect of these shocks on long-run
production.
While Goldin and Margo do find signs that long-term markets were generally selfcorrecting in the long run, they find that shocks did have a significant short-term effect.
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Measuring the random-walk component of wages for 1820-1856, Goldin and Margo show that,
while for most professions the impact of shocks declined over time, and mostly disappeared
within the fifteen-year window, this decline was gradual compared to a baseline white-noise
measure.55 At the same time, it is important to note the regional and occupational variations in
these declines. For example, in the Midwest, random-walk components for unskilled laborers
actually follow the white-noise baseline exactly for the first three years of the window before
leveling off. Since unskilled labor was an essential component of the burgeoning agricultural
production in the Midwest during that period, this suggests that nominal wages in the Midwest
followed prices more closely, reducing the duration of shocks. Thus, while generally wages for
the first Great Moderation did suffer from short- if not long-run fluctuations, the availability of
labor in the expanding west, coupled with more flexible nominal wages for those professions,
likely contributed to the low productive volatility of the period.

F. GLOBAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CLIMATE
Another factor that may have contributed to the reduced macroeconomic volatility of the
Great Moderation is the absence of global warfare. A lower probability of global warfare might
increase investment by firms and raise consumer confidence in the United States. Brown,
Burdekin, and Weidenmier find that the volatility of British Consols, the world’s bellwether
security, decline by more than 50 percent during the period of Pax Britinnica (1830-1913)
compared to the periods 1729-1829 and 1914-2005. A significant portion of the volatility in the
Consol market can be linked to major wars – the American and French Revolutions, the
Napoleonic era, and World Wars I and II. By contrast, during the period 1831-1910, consol
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prices never fell below 80 percent of par. The time period largely coincides with the reign of
Queen Victoria and a lack of major military conflicts involving the British Empire.56
Although the absence of global war shocks may have played a role in the First Great
Moderation, its impact was probably indirect. For example, the period between the War of 1812
and the Civil War was largely free of military conflict in the United States. However, the
industrial production index shows that growth and volatility for the period 1815-1840 were
nearly identical to that of 1791-1840, despite the interruption of trade caused by the War of 1812.
Ultimately, the First Great Moderation ended with the financial panic and recession of
1857. The collapse of Ohio Life Insurance and Trust triggered a liquidity crisis as markets feared
that banks across the nation, interconnected through the Great Moderation, might collapse in
unison. Meanwhile, falling wheat prices threatened the success of western farmers, and the
Supreme Court’s decision in Dred Scott v. Sanford made “free soil” in the burgeoning west more
economically tenuous, hindering western expansion.57 While the panic had subsided by 1859, the
advent of the Civil War signaled the end of the high growth and low volatility of the Great
Moderation.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Great Moderation is regarded by many economists as one of the longest periods of
economic growth and low business cycle volatility in American history. In this paper, I identify
an earlier period of high economic growth and low economic and financial market volatility. I
refer to this period as the First Great Moderation that lasted from 1840 until 1856. The growth
rate of industrial production averaged 8 percent per annum during this period, the fastest 17 years
of economic growth in the 19th century. The rapid economic growth was accompanied by low
business cycle volatility as well as high stock returns and low stock volatility.
I then examine the economic factors behind the First Great Moderation. My analysis
suggests that favorable agricultural supply shocks, the widespread adoption of new railroad
technology, increased financial market integration, real wage convergence, and western
expansion contributed to the longest economic expansion in American history. Other factors,
such as the absence of large global shocks (i.e. no major global wars) probably produced a stable
economic climate. Unlike today, monetary and fiscal policy probably did not play a role in the
First Great Moderation given that the United States did not have a central bank and government
spending was a very small percentage of the US economy. In summary, my analysis suggests
that the First Great Moderation is an unparalleled period in the history of U.S. business cycles
characterized by high economic growth rates and low business cycle volatility.
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DATA APPENDIX
Figure 1: Growth rates in annual Davis IP index, 1791-2010

Gray areas represent negative growth rates in the Davis IP index, which I associate here with
recessions. See also Joseph Davis. “An Improved Annual Chronology of U.S. Business Cycles,”
Journal of Economic History, Vol. 66 (2006), pp. 103–121, and see Table 2. The yellow area
represents the First Great Moderation.
Sources: Joseph Davis, “A Quantity-Based Annual Index of US Industrial Production, 17901915: An Empirical Appraisal of Historical Business-Cycle Fluctuations,” Ph.D. dissertation,
Duke University, 2002; Joseph Davis, “An Annual Index of US Industrial Production, 17901915,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 119, No. 4 (Nov. 2004), pp. 1177-1215; Davis,
“Improved Annual Chronology”; author’s calculations.
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Figure 2: Growth-to-Volatility Ratio (20 Year Average) in Industrial Production, 1810-2010
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Growth-to-volatility ratios are the inverse of coefficients of variation; thus, a high growth-tovolatility ratio indicates high economic stability. Gray areas represent the first and second Great
Moderations.
Sources: Davis, “A Quantity-Based Annual Index”; Davis, “US Industrial Production”. Figure
taken from Davis, Shaffer, and Weidenmier, “America’s First Great Moderation”, forthcoming.
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Figure 3: Monthly percent returns in NYSE index, 1820-1915

Gray areas represent annual recession years. The yellow area represents the First Great
Moderation.
Sources: William N. Goetzmann, Roger G. Ibbotson, and Liang Peng, “A New Historical
Database for the NYSE 1815 to 1925: Performance and Predictability,” Journal of Financial
Markets Vol. 4 (2001) pp. 1-32; Davis, “Improved Annual Chronology”; author’s calculations.
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Figure 4: Average Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) for the Southeast, 1800-1915

PDSI values are on a scale from -6 (representing extreme drought) to +6 (representing extremely
wet conditions). For the years shown, I obtained PDSI values for sample regions representing the
states of NC, SC, TN, AK, LA, AL, MI, and GA (grid points #193-5, 202-4, 211-3, 220-2, 22931, 238-41, 248-50, and 257), which produced a large majority of American cotton during the
antebellum, and averaged these values to produce the index above. Yellow period represents the
First Great Moderation.
Sources: E.R. Cook et al, “North American Summer PDSI Reconstructions, Version 2a,” 2008,
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency Satellite and Information Service,
www.ncdc.noaa.gov/paleo/pdsi08_ts.html; author’s calculations.
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Table 1: Period Average Growth, Standard Deviation, and Coefficient of Variation for Various
Macroeconomic Indices
Average Period Growth
Davis IP Index
NYSE Monthly Index
Davis IP - Durables
Davis IP - Nondurables
Wages (monthly)
Wholesale Prices (monthly)
Cotton Prices (monthly)
Wheat Prices (monthly)
Corn Prices (monthly)
Railroad Construction (monthly)

Pre-1841
0.050
-0.001
0.055
0.069
0.026
0.000
0.001
n/a
0.005
0.070

Great Moderation (1841-1856)
0.081
0.003
0.095
0.069
0.013
0.001
0.003
0.009
0.006
0.008

1866-1915
0.050
0.002
0.057
0.049
0.033
-0.001
0.000
0.005
0.000
0.006

Periodic Std. Dev.
Davis IP Index
NYSE Monthly Index
Davis IP - Durables
Davis IP - Nondurables
Wages (monthly)
Wholesale Prices (monthly)
Cotton Prices (monthly)
Wheat Prices (monthly)
Corn Prices (monthly)
Railroad Construction (monthly)

Pre-1841
0.068
0.045
0.107
0.098
0.169
0.019
0.077
n/a
0.099
0.157

Great Moderation (1841-1856)
0.054
0.035
0.068
0.067
0.060
0.019
0.059
0.122
0.096
0.005

1866-1915
0.076
0.039
0.109
0.050
0.028
0.017
0.062
0.107
0.078
0.003

Coefficients of Variation
Davis IP Index
NYSE Monthly Index
Davis IP - Durables
Davis IP - Nondurables
Wages (monthly)
Wholesale Prices (monthly)
Cotton Prices (monthly)
Wheat Prices (monthly)
Corn Prices (monthly)
Railroad Construction (monthly)

Pre-1841
1.365
68.773
1.924
1.417
6.551
201.994
62.076
n/a
20.250
2.241

Great Moderation (1841-1856)
0.669
11.445
0.721
0.971
4.421
19.917
19.499
13.662
15.152
0.676

1866-1915
1.508
21.390
1.901
1.020
0.865
22.498
171.243
22.424
189.072
0.512

Sources: NYSE monthly index: Goetzmann, Ibbotson, Peng, “Historical Database for the
NYSE”. Davis IP Index and Durable-Nondurable Production: Davis, “A Quantity-Based Annual
Index”; Davis, “US Industrial Production”. Wages: “Table Ba4128 – Index of money wages for
unskilled labor: 1774-1974,” Historical Statistics of the United States, Cambridge University
Press. 2000. Wholesale, Cotton, Wheat, Corn: “United States Producer Price Index – All
Commodities – Annualized,” “Cotton Spot Price (Cents/Pound),” “Wheat #2 Cash Price (US
Dollars/Bushel),” and “Pennsylvania Corn Prices (US$/bushel),” Global Financial Data, Los
Angeles: Global Financial Data, Inc, 2011. Railroad: Davis, “A Quantity-Based Annual Index.”
Author’s calculations
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Table 2: NBER Recession Chronology vs. Davis (2005) Recession Chronology
NBER Chronology
Pe ak

Trough

Davis (2005) Chronology
Pe ak

Trough

Net change
to NBER phase
duration (in yrs.)

Ante be llum industrial cycle s
1802
1807
1811
1815
1822
1825
1828
1833
1836
1839
1845
1847
1853
1856

1804
1810
1812
1821
1823
1826
1829
1834
1838
1843
1846
1848
1855
1858

1802
1807
1811
1815
1822

1803
1808

less 1
less 2

1812
1816

less 5

1823
no re ce ssion*

1828
1833
1836
1839

1829
1834
1837
1840

America's First Great
Moderation
1856

less 1
less 3
no re ce ssion
no re ce ssion
no re ce ssion*

1858

Civil War industrial cycle s
1860
1864

1861
1867

1860
1864

1861
1865

less 2

Postbe llum industrial cycle s
1869
1873
1882
1887
1890
1892
1895
1899

1870
1878
1885
1888
1891
1894
1896
1900

no re ce ssion*
1873
1883

1875

1892
1895

1894
1896

1885

less 3
less 1
no re ce ssion*
no re ce ssion*

no re ce ssion*

“No recession” reflects a period of growth in the Davis IP index where the NBER chronology
lists a recession.
Source: Davis, “Improved Annual Chronology,” p. 106.
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Table 3: Regression on the Relationship Between Durable and Nondurable Goods Production
Variable

Coefficient
0.009
(0.012)

Constant
Non-Durable Goods Production

0.803
(0.223)***

First Great Moderation

0.065
(0.018)***

(Non-Durable Goods
Production)*(First Great Moderation)

-0.571
(0.256)***

Regression dependent variable is growth rate of durable goods production. Asterisks denote
significance at the *10%, **5%, and ***1% levels.
Sources: Davis, “Improved Annual Chronology”; author’s calculations

Table 4: Interest Rates in Major Cities, 1836-1856 – Periodic Mean Rate, Standard Deviation,
and Coefficient of Variation
Boston
(1)
Mean Rate

Standard
Deviation

Coefficient of
Variation

Boston
(2)

New
York

Philadelphia

Charleston

New
Orleans

18361842

11.069

11.198

9.194

10.605

11.937

13.274

18431856

8.653

8.764

6.774

8.323

7.339

8.489

18361842

6.477

7.542

3.744

4.527

5.074

5.766

18431856

3.085

3.530

2.080

3.051

2.181

3.111

18361842

0.585

0.674

0.407

0.427

0.425

0.434

18431856

0.357

0.403

0.307

0.367

0.297

0.366

Sources: Howard Bodenhorn, “Capital Mobility and Financial Integration in Antebellum
America,” The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 52 No. 3 (Sep. 1992), pp. 603-608; author’s
calculations
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